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PRELIMINARY PAPER ON THE LAW 
 OF PERSONAL EXEMPTIONS FROM SEIZURE 
 
Thomas G. W. Telfer, University of Western Ontario. 
Introduction* 
[1] Across the country, there is a “wide disparity” among the various provincial and 
territorial statutes that exempt a debtor’s property from seizure.1  Changing economic and 
social conditions, rates of inflation, and the shift of population from rural to urban areas 
have “stripped the specific exemptions of much of their significance” and reform is “long 
overdue.”2  The proposal to include exemptions in Part 12 of the Uniform Civil 
Enforcement Act provides an opportunity to review the principles that inform exemption 
law.  
 
[2] Part I of the paper examines the principles that inform provincial exemption law and 
how courts have interpreted exemption statutes. Part II considers the various models of 
exemption statutes that need to be considered when designing an appropriate exemption 
regime. Part III offers a brief overview of the law of personal exemptions from seizure 
and highlights the lack of uniformity and some of the idiosyncratic features of provincial 
and territorial legislation. Part IV examines the relationship between secured credit and 
exemptions. The paper concludes with Part V which addresses the implications of the 
reform proposal to adopt a federal exemption list in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. 
This would represent a fundamental change as current bankruptcy law defers to 
provincial legislation to set appropriate exemptions in the debtor’s bankruptcy.3  Given 
space limitations, the paper does not provide a detailed analysis of each aspect of Part 12 
of the proposed Uniform Civil Enforcement Act. Rather, the goal of the paper is to 
highlight some of the key policy choices that are at stake in the design of a uniform 
exemption statute. 
 
I  Principles of Interpretation and the Purposes of Exemption Statutes  
[3] Exemption from seizure is an exception created by law that restricts the rights of 
creditors.4 Provincial and territorial exemption statutes modify the harsh results of the 
common law that permitted the sheriff to seize and sell all the personal goods and chattels 
of the debtor that could be found and sold, with the exception of wearing apparel in 
actual use.5 As exemption statutes are a derogation of the common law rights of creditors 
there is a line of case law that has adopted the principle that such exemption statutes 
should be construed strictly.6 However, there is a competing line of cases which 
concludes that exemption statutes are remedial and are to be given a liberal interpretation 
to protect the debtor.7 This latter principle derives support from a large number of cases 
that refer to the general purpose of exemption law.8 However, courts will not always 
correct legislative oversight or update an exemption statute by relying upon the broad 
underlying principles of exemption law.9 In some instances the plain reading of a statute 
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has taken precedence over a purposive interpretation even where the plain reading 
deprives a debtor of an exemption.  
 
[4] Although early western exemption statutes were designed in part to attract settlers, 
more recent exemption statutes focus on the more general purpose of protecting the 
debtor and the debtor’s family by preserving some minimum level of subsistence and 
dignity.10 Professor Dunlop argues that “[i]t is not acceptable that creditors, no matter 
how just the debt, should have the power to take from debtors the basic necessities of 
life.”11 Exemption statutes permit the debtor to retain some essentials or what has been 
called the “basics of life while making the bulk of his or her assets available to satisfy 
judgment creditors.”12  In a 2001 report, Modernization of Saskatchewan Money 
Judgment Enforcement Law, Professors Buckwold and Cuming recognized that beyond 
maintaining “a subsistence standard of living” exemption law should also permit a debtor 
and a debtor’s family “to function as healthy, productive and contributing members of 
society.” This broader rationale might justify a wider scope of necessities that are related 
to the reasonable educational, health and recreational needs of the debtor and the debtor’s 
dependents. Under the Saskatchewan proposal a motor vehicle exemption might be 
sought where it would accommodate “children’s participation in sports, musical and other 
artistic or cultural programs.”13 
 
[5] Under the general category of necessities many exemption statutes include such items 
as household furniture, wearing apparel, food and fuel with some jurisdictions 
recognizing a motor vehicle as a basic necessity up to a fixed dollar amount. Separate 
legislation in some jurisdictions also includes burial plots and monies paid into a pre-paid 
funeral plan.14 A debtor’s basic necessity may also include shelter and some jurisdictions 
provide some form of exemption for residential property. The basis for a personal 
residence exemption is discussed below in Part V.  Provincial legislation also extends to 
matters of life insurance, pensions, and wage garnishment.  This report focuses on the 
various ways provincial legislation exempts tangible personal property and real property 
from seizure.  
 
[6] Exemptions also preserve the means for debtors to “survive and to earn a living, thus 
contributing to their rehabilitation as citizens and to their capacity to repay their debts.”15  
The Ontario Law Reform Commission concluded that it was of great importance to leave 
the debtor “with the wherewithal to work in the community and earn a decent living.”16 
Under this second goal, exemption statutes protect items of personal property, such as 
tools of trade or agricultural implements, which are important to the debtor’s livelihood. 
In some provinces farm land is also protected. 
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[7] In addition, preserving the economic vitality of the debtor has been justified from the 
broader perspective of the public interest. If creditors were permitted to “destroy debtors’ 
economic viability, their continued maintenance would fall to society.”17 Debtors should 
not be “cast upon the community with nothing, penniless with the likelihood of becoming 
a public charge.”18 Finally, exemption statutes minimize the judgment debtor’s loss that 
may occur through forced execution sales.  Such a sale would offer little return to the 
creditors, yet it may impose considerable hardship on the debtor.19 Some provincial 
statutes protect items of sentimental value. 
 
[8] The above policies of exemption law relate to a debtor as an individual and not to 
corporate entities.20 Many provincial exemption statutes expressly indicate that the 
exemptions are only available to a natural person.21 However, proposals contained in the 
2001 Saskatchewan Money Judgments Report and the Draft Uniform Civil Enforcement 
Act recognize that a small closely held corporation “may in reality be nothing more than 
an individual using an incorporated form of business organization.”22 The Draft Uniform 
Civil Enforcement Act, subject to specific limitations, would enable an individual 
holding a controlling interest in a corporation to exempt property owned by the corporate 
debtor.23  This would represent a fundamental change in the law. Balanced against the 
need to ignore formal legal structures are concerns whether appropriate and clear 
limitations can be included which will guard against abuse and avoid the problem of a 
thinly capitalized corporation. Furthermore, incorporation affords the benefit of limited 
liability to the principals of the company and it is relevant to ask whether those principals 
should also obtain the benefits of exemptions.24  
 
[9] Although there appears to be a general consensus about the general aims of exemption 
law, there is also recognition that any regime must balance the interests of both debtors 
and creditors.25 The Ontario Law Reform Commission in its 1981 Report recognized that 
while “exemptions must be fair, we must not lose sight of the fact that the debtor has a 
legal obligation to repay his debts within a reasonable period of time.”26 Creditors may 
find themselves in financial difficulty as a result of having to forego their rights.27 The 
Manitoba Law Reform Commission pointed out that “it must be remembered that, by 
definition, a judgment creditor has been found by a court to be owed a sum by the 
judgment debtor” and it is the creditor that must be regarded as the “aggrieved party” 
until the debt has been paid.28 The challenge lies in achieving the proper balance between 
debtor and creditor interests by defining the modest and dignified lifestyle in the form of 
specific legislation.   
 
II Models of Exemption Statutes  
[10] In designing exemption statutes, legislators have traditionally adopted a paternalistic 
view by wanting to define “what values are important to their society and to impose those 
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values on debtors who are apparently seen as incapable of choosing well for 
themselves.”29 Thus most exemption statutes seek to define categories of exempt property 
as opposed to granting a debtor a lump sum amount from which any property might be 
selected. These two competing models are discussed below. 
A) Specific Lists 
[11] Traditional exemption statutes provided very detailed and lengthy lists of exempt 
property.  For example, the 1887 Ontario Execution Act enabled a debtor to retain a long 
list of items including one coal scuttle, one washboard, three smoothing irons, all 
spinning wheels, one gun and six traps.  The list also specified how many plates, tea pots 
and specific items of cutlery were exempt from seizure.30 Most jurisdictions have 
abandoned these specific lists in favour of more general or selective categories. However, 
as demonstrated below in Part III, not all idiosyncratic lists have been eliminated. 
Remnants of a province’s agricultural past still affect current law. 
 
[12] Specific exemption lists, while providing certainty, are at risk of becoming obsolete 
when the listed articles are no longer a necessity in the debtor’s life.31  It would be an 
endless task to anticipate all forms of personal property that might be listed as exempt in 
provincial legislation.32  However, not all specific exemptions are anachronistic or out of 
date.  A specific exemption may also reflect a general consensus that a particular item is a 
basic necessity. Several provinces have listed a motor vehicle up to a monetary amount as 
exempt property. 
B) Selective Lists 
[13] A more modern method used in provincial exemption statutes is to provide a 
selective list or general category of exempt property.  Provincial exemption statutes 
provide an exemption for unspecified necessary tools used in the debtor’s trade or the 
general category of household furnishings.  A more general category is unlikely to 
become obsolete, as the broad nature of the exemption will incorporate new types of 
chattels as they become either a basic necessity or necessary to the debtor’s livelihood.33   
C) Limitations on Specific or Selective Lists 
[14] Given the wide range of values of property that might fall within a specific or 
selective list, statutes seek to qualify these exemptions either with a dollar amount and/or 
a limitation focusing on the necessity of the item. In Ontario, “necessary and ordinary 
wearing apparel” of the debtor is exempt up to $5000.  If no monetary cap is set an 
exemption is typically limited by some defined notion of necessity.  The Saskatchewan 
Money Judgment Report described this more open ended standard as a test of functional 
adequacy. For example, the Saskatchewan Report recommended that the debtor be able to 
retain “household furnishings necessary to allow the judgment debtor and the judgment 
debtor’s family and dependents to maintain a functional household.”34 
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[15] There are inherent problems with the specific lists, monetary caps, and more open 
ended tests of necessity or function. These are typical problems associated with fixed 
rules and open ended standards.35  The choice is how best to balance the certainty of 
fixed rules with appropriate open ended standards. While a fixed rule will have the 
advantage of providing certainty and reduced litigation, it is unable to accommodate 
individual circumstances in a flexible way. Specific lists and monetary caps may become 
obsolete as the debtors’ needs or economic conditions change over time. Many 
jurisdictions do not have any mechanism which provides for an automatic updating of the 
monetary amounts.36  
 
[16] In contrast, a more open ended standard that requires interpretation on a case by case 
basis is capable of adapting to the individual circumstances and needs of the parties. 
Given that it is unlikely that all jurisdictions will agree to the same fixed values for each 
category of property, it might seem that the best hope for a uniform statute lies with 
selective lists tied to some general standard or functional test of necessity without 
monetary limits. An important question is whether such a uniform statute containing 
broad standards is capable of being applied in a uniform way.  Standards are likely to 
involve increased litigation costs and are at risk of being inconsistently interpreted over 
time and in different regions.  Ambiguous or vague provisions may lead to “inequality of 
treatment of debtors and their creditors where sheriffs take differing views of the law.”37 
Indeed, there has been a great deal of case law on what is a necessary or required tool of 
trade with differing views on whether the provision should be interpreted in a broad or 
narrow manner.38 Even when a court intervenes to interpret an open ended standard the 
guidance itself may not offer any more certainty.39  
D) Lump Sums 
[17] An alternative model abandons any attempt to generally or specifically describe 
categories of exempt property that will form the debtor’s basic necessities or the property 
required to earn an income. Debtors, rather than the state, may be in a better position to 
know and understand what specific items of property will be essential to their own 
rehabilitation.40 This approach favours a more individualized discretionary regime by 
granting debtors a lump sum exemption.41   
 
[18] A lump sum approach provides a debtor with the right to select any description of 
goods and chattels up to a specified monetary sum.42 There are several advantages to 
such an approach that go beyond the inherent flexibility of the regime. As long as the 
dollar amount is kept current there is no danger that the exemption will become obsolete.  
A lump sum approach avoids interpretive questions of necessity that are common with 
tool of trade or agricultural implements.43  
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[19] Although a lump sum approach offers the possibility of giving the debtor freedom to 
select items, it has not found acceptance in Canadian law.44 Legislators may mistrust 
debtors’ ability to choose wisely and prefer a paternalistic approach of identifying the 
types of property that a debtor should preserve.45  A lump sum approach may not actually 
fulfill the policy of exemption law.  In some instances a debtor may fail to choose the 
very basic necessities or items required to earn a livelihood.46  
 
[20] The benefits of the “complete individualization of exemptions” may be outweighed 
by the costs of such a regime.47  This model “requires an appraisal of all of the 
individual’s property whenever a creditor makes a levy on any of the debtor’s individual 
property” and was rejected by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (NCCUSL) in its Uniform Exemption Act.48 Further, a lump sum approach, 
while appearing flexible, might be too generous “for a labourer owning no tools of his 
own but too limited for a self employed plumber or farmer who has to have expensive 
equipment.”49 Finally, a lump sum approach offers little prospects for uniformity.  It is 
unlikely that all jurisdictions would agree to a uniform sum. 
E) Wild Cards and Spillovers 
[21] If lump sums are not acceptable is there an alternative mechanism to address the 
concern that selective or specific lists discriminate against debtors that have failed to 
acquire the types of assets listed in an exemption statute?50 A variation of a lump sum 
approach is to adopt, what has become known in the United States as a “wild card 
exemption”51 which is an exemption not tied to “a particular form of property.”52  Several 
states permit a debtor an additional wild card exemption for any property up to a fixed 
amount beyond the listed categories. The US Bankruptcy Code enumerates various types 
of exemptions and then additionally allows a debtor to retain his or her “aggregate 
interest in any property” not to exceed in value $925.53  To address the potential for 
discrimination against non-home owners some US exemption statutes go further and 
provide to the non-home owner an additional wildcard exemption.54  The US Bankruptcy 
Code, in addition to the $925 wildcard exemption noted above, enables a debtor to retain  
up to $9250 “of any unused amount” of the debtor’s residential property exemption.55    
 
[22] A wild card exemption might be used to increase the total value of exempt assets in 
an enumerated category. This “corrects the imbalance by allowing the debtor to use the 
unused portion of his home exemption to raise the ceilings on the car, [or] household 
exemptions.”56 This is known as a “spill over” exemption. For example, if a statute 
limited a debtor to a $10,000 tool of trade exemption, he or she may be able to claim 
additional tools of trade beyond that limit by relying on an available wild card 
exemption.57 However, “any property” has been interpreted liberally leaving the debtor 
free to select additional property from existing categories of exempt property as well as 
property that does not fall within the scope of an enumerated list.58  
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F) An Alternative Discretionary Approach 
[23] Rather than granting a debtor a wild card exemption, a statute might include some 
additional discretionary powers to take into account the debtor’s individual 
circumstances.  In New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and PEI a secured party is prohibited 
from seizing consumer goods, if the court determines that the “loss of the consumer 
goods would cause serious hardship to the debtor or dependent or the costs of seizing and 
selling the goods would be disproportionate to the value seized.”59 A more specific form 
of discretion, which might allow a debtor to seek protection for an exemption beyond the 
maximum prescribed limit, is contemplated in the Draft Uniform Civil Enforcement Act 
submitted by the Working Group. Where a jurisdiction sets a maximum amount for a 
personal residential exemption, section 163/206(2) of the Draft Act permits the debtor or 
debtor’s dependents to make an application to the court to declare a principal residence 
exempt until a further order of the court. A court must be satisfied that the prescribed 
amount “will not enable a judgment debtor and his or her dependents to have a minimally 
reasonable standard of residential accommodation” or “disposition of the property in an 
enforcement proceeding will cause serious hardship to a judgment debtor or his or her 
dependents.”60 
 
III  Overview of Provincial and Territorial Exemptions 
A) Property Required for Basic Necessities  
[24] Although there may be a general consensus that the law must protect the debtor’s 
basic necessities, there is considerable variation in the ways in which legislation limits 
this category.61 The few reported cases on subsistence assets suggest that it will be 
relatively rare that parties will litigate over low cost items.62 While these items may be of 
little monetary value to creditors, they obviously have great value and importance to the 
debtor and his or her family.  
i) Food and Fuel63 
[25] All provinces and territories, but for British Columbia, provide an express provision 
for some amount of food for the debtor and dependents.  “Required” or “necessary” food 
for the debtor and the debtor’s family are limited by a specified time period in Alberta 
(12 months), Manitoba (6 months), New Brunswick (3 months), Newfoundland and 
Labradour (12 months), Northwest Territories (12 months) and Yukon (12 months).  
 
[26] Other provinces limit the exemption not by time period but by what is functionally 
equivalent to necessary food. In Nova Scotia, “all fuel and food reasonably necessary for 
the ordinary use of the family” is exempt. A number of provinces combine the food 
exemption with other categories of essential items such as fuel which is limited either by 
a time period or the more general limitation of what is reasonably necessary.64  There is 
no express protection of fuel in British Columbia and Alberta. 
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[27] The Saskatchewan Exemptions Act reflects its agricultural roots and offers a unique 
rural approach to the protection of food and fuel. In Saskatchewan the following is 
declared free from seizure: 
 grain, flour, vegetables and meat, whether prepared for use or on foot, or any of 
them, sufficient when converted into cash to provide food and fuel for heating 
purposes for the execution debtor and his family until the next ensuing harvest.65 
 
[28] Both Ontario and PEI combine food and fuel in the same provision with other 
essential items such as household furniture, utensils and equipment and impose a 
monetary cap for the listed items (Ontario $10,000; PEI $2000).66 The inclusion of fuel as 
exempt property perhaps reflects a time when many debtors purchased their own supply 
of coal.  If fuel is to remain a more realistic exemption would cover the “cost of fuel” for 
a specified period.67 
ii) Clothing68 
[29] Every jurisdiction in Canada recognizes a form of exemption for clothing or wearing 
apparel of the debtor and the debtor’s dependents. Most jurisdictions simply qualify or 
limit this category by what is necessary or ordinary and do not impose any monetary 
limit.  In contrast, three provinces impose a monetary cap on necessary clothing: Alberta 
($4000), Ontario ($5000) and Newfoundland and Labradour ($4000).   
 iii) Household Furnishings69 
[30] All provinces and territories have abandoned itemized lists of household property in 
favour of a more general category of household furnishings and appliances.  However, 
there is no uniform approach to limiting this category. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick 
enable the debtor to retain “furniture, household furnishings and appliances reasonably 
necessary for the debtor and his family” of no particular fixed value.70 Manitoba ($4500) 
and Quebec ($6000) combine a dollar amount with a form of a reasonably necessary 
standard.71 
  
[31] In contrast a number of provinces simply fix a dollar amount without imposing any 
requirement of proof of necessity. British Columbia, Alberta, and Newfoundland and 
Labrador enable a debtor to retain household furnishings and appliances to a value 
totaling $4000 whereas Saskatchewan has set the limit at $4500.72  Ontario ($10,000), 
PEI ($2000), Northwest Territories ($200) and Yukon ($200) also impose a dollar cap but 
additionally require that the household furniture be “contained in and form part of the 
permanent home.”  
iv) Sentimental value items73 
[32] Items of sentimental value pose a particular problem in balancing the interests of 
debtors and creditors if one fixes a monetary cap. Wedding rings or family heirlooms 
may be irreplaceable and at the same time be of high market value.  A debtor may seek to 
shelter an asset behind a sentimental claim which may deprive a creditor of a valuable 
asset.74 However, in those jurisdictions that protect sentimental property the emphasis has 
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been to protect items of high sentimental value that will not necessarily be of high market 
value. Such provisions acknowledge that “the removal of such property in enforcement 
proceedings would be heartless when its intrinsic value to the debtor is far greater than 
the amount that will be realized by the creditors.”75  Although it might be rare for a 
creditor to seize items that are of high religious or sentimental value to the debtor, such 
provisions protect against the possibility of the threats of seizure and resulting hardship 
that would be imposed on the debtor and his or her family.76 
 
[33] In Manitoba “articles and furniture necessary to the performance of religious 
services” are exempt from seizure. Similarly in Quebec, “consecrated vessels and things 
used for religious worship” are exempt as well as “family papers and portraits, medals 
and other decorations.”  Newfoundland and Labrador offer a more general exemption for 
“items of sentimental value” but cap the value at $500. New Brunswick and 
Newfoundland and Labrador also provide a separate exemption for pets.  
 v) Medical Aids77 
[34] Seven provinces (British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec, New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador) have included a form of a “required” or 
“reasonably necessary” medical aid of no fixed amount as part of their basic exemption 
statute.78 Such exemptions sustain the debtor’s health but some jurisdictions acknowledge 
that the medical aid may assist the debtor in employment or trade.79  Most jurisdictions 
opt for a more general phrase of “medical and dental aids” while Manitoba provides an 
illustrative list of health aids such as “a wheelchair, an air-conditioner, an elevator, a 
hearing aid, eye glasses and prosthetic or orthopedic equipment”.80  
 
[35] In the absence of a specific medical aid exemption in the Saskatchewan Exemptions 
Act, a quadriplegic in Re Guest81 claimed a specially equipped motor vehicle under the 
general motor vehicle provision. In Saskatchewan a motor vehicle will be exempt if it is 
“necessary for the proper and efficient conduct of the execution debtor's business, trade, 
calling or profession.” The bankrupt survived on disability benefits and volunteered for 
the local health authority.  He used the van to provide rides to shut-ins with disabilities 
and to deliver groceries and toiletries to individuals with disabilities.   
 
[36] As the bankrupt was not employed and did not have an occupation, profession, trade 
or business for which he received payment the court denied the claim.  The court 
recognized that the provincial legislation had not kept pace with medical advances 
designed to enable quadriplegics to “become independent and valued members of 
society.”82  The court acknowledged that in the absence of a specific exemption for a 
medical aid the decision deprived the bankrupt of an asset which ensured his 
independence.83 
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 vi) Motor Vehicles 
[37] Traditionally, if a debtor wanted to claim a motor vehicle as exempt property many 
statutes required the motor vehicle to be linked to the debtor’s livelihood. More recently 
several provinces have amended their exemption statutes to acknowledge that a motor 
vehicle is a basic necessity.84 Under this approach any debtor owning a motor vehicle has 
the ability to claim an exemption whether or not the vehicle is used in the debtor’s trade, 
business or occupation.85 Several provinces have motor vehicle exemptions with a set 
monetary amount:  British Columbia ($5000), Alberta ($5000),86 Ontario ($5000), Nova 
Scotia ($3000), PEI ($3000), Newfoundland and Labradour ($2000).87  
 
[38] The fact that three jurisdictions have selected $5000 as the upper limit suggests a 
degree of uniformity. However, there are two distinct views on whether a debtor is 
entitled to claim the dollar value up to the monetary limit as exempt where the value of 
the motor vehicle exceeds the limit. Under current case law, where a car is valued at more 
than $5000, a debtor in Alberta will be entitled to keep $5000 as exempt property while a 
debtor in Ontario will not be entitled to an exemption for any of the proceeds from the 
sale of the motor vehicle.88  
[39] The Alberta approach recognizes that a monetary limit ensures that a debtor does not 
shelter a more expensive car than is reasonably necessary.  However, allowing the debtor 
to claim an exemption for the value up to the monetary limit is still justifiable. If a debtor 
is denied an exemption where the car is worth more than the monetary limit, there will 
not be “any opportunity to buy a more modest vehicle after a seizure has occurred.”89 The 
Alberta Law Reform Institute in 1991 recommended that a debtor be entitled to claim an 
exemption for the prescribed monetary amount even where the value of the vehicle 
exceeded the set amount. This recommendation was adopted in the Alberta Civil 
Enforcement Act and endorsed by Re Pearson.90 This approach also avoids valuation 
disputes which will become crucial in the all or nothing approach currently in place in 
Ontario. 
[40] The Ontario Execution Act includes an exemption for “a motor vehicle not 
exceeding…$5000.”91 Although the excess value issue had been debated and resolved in 
Alberta it appears that this matter was not considered when the Ontario Execution Act 
was amended in 2001.  Earlier this year, in Re Fields92 the Ontario Court of Appeal 
examined this provision in light of a motor vehicle valued at $11,000. The Court held that 
the entire value of the vehicle was not exempt.  
[41] The Court of Appeal accepted that the purpose of exemptions was to “allow a debtor 
to retain the basics of life.” From a public policy perspective, the Court acknowledged 
that the interpretation of the statute that would have provided the debtor with a $5000 
exemption was “compelling”.93 To allow a debtor $5000 would “give the section the 
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interpretation that makes most common sense, would be most helpful to debtors and 
would fit with the intent and purpose of the philosophy of exemptions.” The Court noted 
that whereas s. 4 of the Ontario Execution Act contemplated that the debtor was entitled 
to receive up to the monetary limit for other categories of personal property exceeding 
those limits, motor vehicles were not listed in that provision.  In the end Feldman J.A. 
concluded that the failure to amend s. 4 when the motor vehicle provision was added was 
likely an “oversight.”  If it was such an oversight, “it is only the legislature and not the 
court that can make the correction.”94  
 
[42] Not all exemption statutes recognize a motor vehicle as a basic necessity. Manitoba, 
New Brunswick and Saskatchewan have retained the traditional approach by requiring 
that the vehicle be required for earning a livelihood.95 While New Brunswick and 
Manitoba cap this exemption at $3000, in Saskatchewan a non farmer debtor may claim a 
motor vehicle of no set value “necessary for the proper and efficient conduct of the 
execution debtor’s business, trade calling or profession.”96 Although Quebec, Yukon, and 
Northwest Territories do not include any express motor vehicle exemption, a debtor 
might succeed in making a claim under the more general category of tools of trade.97   
 
[43] In those jurisdictions where a debtor must establish a link between a motor vehicle 
and a livelihood, the debtor may find that alleging a need for transportation to work is not 
enough. The test of a necessary vehicle for a debtor’s livelihood does not automatically 
entitle the debtor to travel in his or her own motor vehicle to work. It has been held that 
alternatives such as renting, using public transit and taxis achieve the same result without 
prejudicing creditors. 98 
 
 B) Property Required for the Debtor’s Livelihood 
[44] Apart from preserving basic necessities, exemption statutes also focus on assets that 
enable the debtor to earn a livelihood.99   In some instances the tools of trade exemption 
may reflect the province’s economic history. Thus one finds “one cross plough…one 
horse rake…and one seed drill” in early Alberta legislation100 and “fishing nets” in early 
Nova Scotia legislation.101  Earlier efforts to restrict tools of trade to items required for 
manual work have in many instances been overcome by case law and amendments to 
legislation which now contemplate a broader range of occupations, trade, business, 
calling or profession as well as recognizing a motor vehicle as a possible tool of trade. 102 
However, as discussed below not all evidence of a province’s earlier economic history 
has been removed from the statutes. 
i) Tools of Trade Non Farmer 
 [45] The infinite variety of occupations and associated tools makes it impossible to 
precisely list specific types of exempt property103 and many jurisdictions have opted to 
use more general language.104 Ontario for example, exempts “tools and instruments and 
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other chattels ordinarily used by the debtor in the debtor's business, profession or 
calling.” In some instances, the antiquated term “tools” or “tools of trade” has been 
dropped in favour of an even more general approach.  For example, in Alberta a non-
farming debtor may retain “personal property” used to earn income from the debtor’s 
occupation up to the value of $10,000.105   
 
[46] Five jurisdictions have chosen $10,000 for the upper limit of this category (Alberta, 
British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador, Ontario).  Beyond these jurisdictions, 
there is little agreement on what is an appropriate cap ($7,500 Manitoba; $6,500 New 
Brunswick; $4,500 Saskatchewan; $2,000 PEI; $ 1,000 Nova Scotia; $600 combined with 
agricultural exemption: Yukon and Northwest Territories). Quebec exempts “the 
instruments of work needed for the personal exercise of his professional activity” with no 
specific monetary limit.  
ii) Agricultural and fishing exemptions 
[47] Many regions have adopted separate occupational exemptions specific to agriculture 
or fishing.  A relevant question is whether the current provisions continue to reflect the 
importance of the agricultural and fishing industry to a geographic region or whether they 
are more “closely related to the cultural and economic history of a province/territory.”106 
The cyclical nature of farming operations and the higher costs of agricultural equipment 
are typical justifications given for these unique exemptions. However, a non farming 
debtor engaged in business operations may also incur cyclical periods of success and 
decline and utilize high cost equipment.107 The National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Law in its Model Uniform Exemption Act chose not to single out 
farmers for special treatment.108 
 
[48] There is little uniformity on the need for or scope of agricultural exemptions. At one 
end of the spectrum British Columbia and Quebec offer no separate or unique agricultural 
exemption in their main statute.  In contrast many jurisdictions have incorporated various 
agricultural exemptions. In Saskatchewan, for example, specific legislation exempts 
several general categories of agricultural items including livestock, farm machinery and 
equipment, books, tools, seed grain and crops.109  
 
[49] There are several instances where provinces have retained very specific lists rather 
than more general categories of agricultural items.  For example, in New Brunswick a 
debtor may claim an exemption of “two horses and sets of harness, two cows, ten sheep, 
two hogs and twenty fowl” without any need to show that the items are necessary or are 
reasonably required.110  The New Brunswick statute also exempts “seed grain and 
potatoes required for seeding and planting purposes to the following quantities: forty 
bushels of oats, ten bushels of barley, ten bushels of buckwheat, ten bushels of wheat and 
thirty-five barrels of potatoes.”  
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[50] The Ontario Execution Act continues to exempt livestock, fowl, bees, seed for 100 
acres, and 14 bushels of potatoes as well as the more general categories of books, tools 
and implements associated with the “tillage of the soil” or farming. In addition, where 
seizure is made between October 1 and April 30, the Execution Act also exempts “such 
food and bedding as are necessary to feed and bed the livestock and fowl” until the 30th 
day of April next following. 
 
[51] Whereas Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba limit agricultural equipment to those 
items necessary for a particular fixed time period, other jurisdictions cap this category 
with a dollar amount ($25,000 Ontario; Newfoundland and Labradour $10,000; Prince 
Edward Island $5000; Nova Scotia $1000, Northwest Territories and Yukon $600 
combined with more general tool of trade). 
 
[52] Quebec, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador have enacted exemptions 
specific to fishing. In Quebec a debtor’s “fishing boats and equipment cannot be seized or 
sold between May 1 and November 1.” In Nova Scotia “fishing nets” are specifically 
included in the more general list of “farm equipment and tools and implements” used in 
the debtor’s chief occupation. This entire list is exempt to the value of $1000.  In 
Newfoundland and Labrador, where a debtor’s primary occupation is fishing or 
aquaculture, a debtor may claim personal property used by and necessary for the debtor 
to earn an income in that occupation to the value of $10,000. The absence of a specific 
fishing equipment exemption in other jurisdictions does not preclude a debtor from 
claiming an exemption under the more general tools of trade provisions.111  
 
C) Homestead and Personal Residence Exemptions 
[53] Beyond items of personal property, some provinces allow debtors to claim an 
exemption for land and residential dwelling and these provisions can be traced back to 
the efforts of the western provinces to encourage settlement112 and to ensure that “as 
much land should be brought and kept under cultivation as possible.”113  The homestead 
exemption, as it became known, preserved the farmer’s personal residence and land up to 
a specified maximum.  In the 1910 case of Re Hetherington, Lamont J. identified the 
underlying policy behind the homestead exemption: 
The leading and fundamental idea connected with a homestead is, 
unquestionably, associated with that of a place of residence for a family, 
where the independence and security of a home may be enjoyed without 
the danger of loss, harassment or disturbance by reason of the 
improvidence of the head or other member of the family. It is a secure 
asylum, of which the family cannot be deprived by creditors….The 
purpose of the Exemptions Ordinance being to preserve to the debtor and 
his family a home in which they can dwell without risk of disturbance 
from creditors….114 
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[54] The inclusion of land in early Western homestead exemption legislation was 
designed to ensure that farmers had some means of livelihood to support themselves and 
their families.115 For the urban dweller, some provinces have enacted a separate 
residential property exemption.  However, there are two distinct attitudes on this issue.  
While some western provinces offer, by Canadian standards, generous exemptions for a 
homestead or a personal residence, Ontario and some Atlantic provinces offer no 
exemption for residential property. 
i) Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta 
[55] Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta all offer separate exemptions for farm land and 
residential property.116  In Alberta, where the debtor’s primary occupation is farming up 
to 160 acres of land is exempt if the enforcement debtor’s principal residence is located 
on that land and the land is part of the debtor’s farm.117  In Alberta, a debtor may claim a 
principal residence exemption up to $40,000. In Manitoba, farm land of not more than 
160 acres is exempt provided that it is “farm land upon which the judgment debtor or his 
family actually resides or which he cultivates, either wholly or in part, or which he 
actually uses for grazing or other purposes.” Manitoba legislation also protects the house, 
stables, barns, and fences, on the judgment debtor’s farm. Non farmers in Manitoba 
debtors are entitled to a $2500 personal residence exemption. In Saskatchewan, the 
debtor’s house and buildings occupied by the debtor and the lots on which they are 
located are exempt to the extent of $32,000.118  The Saskatchewan Exemptions Act also 
exempts the homestead provided it is not more than 160 acres.119 
ii) Other Jurisdictions 
[56] Ontario and Nova Scotia do not provide any form of exemption for a personal 
residence or land. In New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, there is no specific 
exemption for a personal residence, and while land may be seized, it cannot be sold until 
after the seizure and sale of all of a debtor’s personal estate.  
 
[57] In addition to the three western provinces discussed above, British Columbia 
($12,000 or $9000), Quebec ($10,000), Newfoundland and Labradour ($10,000), Yukon 
($3000) and Northwest Territories ($3000) all provide some limited protection for the 
debtor’s residential home. Apart from British Columbia, no province has attempted to 
make a distinction between different housing markets within a province. Thus, debtors in 
the Capital Regional District of Victoria and the Vancouver region are granted a $12,000 
principal residence exemption whereas all other debtors in British Columbia only receive 
a $9000 exemption.   
iii) Farm Land and Shelter: Current Rationale? 
[58] If the encouragement of settlement no longer justifies a homestead and residential 
property exemption what current policy rationale supports the retention or addition of 
such exemptions?120 First, to the extent that farm land is protected, a debtor’s ability to 
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earn an income is preserved. Modern case law recognizes the importance of protecting 
the livelihood of the farmer.121 If that is the case it remains relevant to ask whether the 
160 acres in Manitoba, Saskatchewan or Alberta is sufficient or indeed excessive to that 
larger goal.122 The limit on the 160 acres provision is by size rather than by monetary 
amount. This raises the question of whether an excessively valuable asset is being 
protected from the claims of creditors.123   
 
[59] The scope of the residential exemption depends upon how broadly one justifies the 
rationale for exempting the debtor’s home. The residential property exemption at a bare 
minimum can be justified as a preservation of the basic necessity of shelter.124  A debtor 
should not be “left destitute, without a home”125 and such provisions protect the debtor 
from “undue economic hardship, or perhaps more accurately, economic disaster, given 
that the debtor’s home is at stake.”126 In order to preserve this basic necessity, the Ontario 
Law Reform Commission recommended that debtors owning their own residences be 
permitted to retain sufficient funds from the execution sale to secure rental 
accommodation and to cover moving expenses.127 Anything beyond this minimum level 
of subsistence “may unduly prejudice the rights of creditors and go well beyond what is 
necessary to protect debtors and their families against the deprivation of shelter.”128   
 
[60] However a broader policy rationale has been offered which would expand the 
residential exemption beyond mere shelter.  The Alberta Law Reform Institute in its 1991 
Report rejected the more limited justification of shelter in favour of a broader exemption 
which protects home ownership.  The home ownership interest, which was said to reflect 
an Alberta attitude, was to be protected “even at the expense of the creditor’s interest.” 
Most Albertans, the report concluded, would consider that to deprive a debtor of a home 
would be “unreasonably harsh in a manner that depriving him or her of other economic 
assets would not be.”129 
 
[61] If one accepts the contention that home ownership justifies a higher level of 
exemption beyond a mere shelter provision, there are different views on what level is 
required to protect home ownership.130 Furthermore, one must ask whether the relatively 
low monetary limits in some jurisdictions truly act as a means of encouraging home 
ownership or even preserving shelter for the family at all.131  
 
IV Secured creditors   
A) Exemptions and Secured Creditors 
[62] Although there is a strong justification that the policy of exemption law should 
equally apply to secured creditors, traditionally it has not. In many jurisdictions secured 
parties are able to exercise their right to seize pursuant to the terms of their security 
agreement notwithstanding the existence of the provincial exemption statute.132 Ontario’s 
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Execution Act, for example, reflects this traditional approach. The Execution Act only 
applies to exempt chattels “from seizure under writ issued out of any court.” Thus in Re 
Vanhove133 a perfected secured party was not precluded by the Execution Act from 
seizing household or consumer goods.   
 
[63] In contrast to this traditional approach, several jurisdictions take the view that a 
secured party should not be able to jeopardize a debtor’s ability to maintain household 
furnishings or other basic necessities particularly when the secured party did not provide 
the financing to enable the debtor to acquire those goods.134  For example, Saskatchewan, 
New Brunswick, PEI, and Nova Scotia all restrict the rights of secured creditors to seize 
exempt property but create an exception in favour of purchase money security 
interests.135 Although this might be more properly seen as an issue for Personal Property 
Security law reform, exemption reform is inherently tied to secured transactions and there 
is merit to including provisions which enable the debtor to rely on exemptions as against 
non-purchase money secured parties. Given the lack of uniformity on this issue the 
Personal Insolvency Task Force has recommended that the Bankruptcy and Insolvency 
Act be amended to avoid non-purchase money security interests in personal property that 
would otherwise be exempt from seizure.136 
 
[64] Even where a province has adopted specific exemptions that will shelter assets from 
a secured creditor, such exemptions do not necessarily match the exemptions that apply 
to execution creditors and anomalies exist. Provinces have not necessarily revisited the 
original exemptions that apply to execution creditors to ensure that the two regimes have 
been harmonized. For example, a debtor in PEI and Nova Scotia will have a $3000 motor 
vehicle exemption against execution creditors and a $6500 motor vehicle exemption 
against a non-purchase money secured creditor if the motor vehicle is required by the 
debtor for employment.137  
B) Unperfected Security Interests in Exempt Property and Bankruptcy. 
[65] The different approaches to exempt property and security interests across the country 
have created a flow on effect when the debtor declares bankruptcy and the secured 
party’s security interest is unperfected. The problem of unperfected security interests may 
commonly arise when the debtor moves a motor vehicle into a new jurisdiction.  
 
[66] Provincial Personal Property Security legislation provides a straightforward 
resolution of the conflict between an unperfected security interest and the trustee in 
bankruptcy.  Until perfected the security interest will not be effective against a trustee in 
bankruptcy.138   A number of more complex questions arise when the debtor is bankrupt 
and the secured party has an unperfected security interest in what would otherwise be 
exempt from seizure and beyond the reach of the trustee in bankruptcy. At present there 
is no uniform answer to this issue. Courts in Alberta, Ontario and Nova Scotia have 
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analyzed this issue in three different ways owing to the lack of provincial uniformity on 
exemptions.139 
 
[67] To determine whether or not property is exempt in a bankruptcy one must consult 
the relevant underlying provincial statute which gives rise to the exemption.140 Section 
67(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act “incorporates by reference”141 provincial 
exemption legislation. When there is a bankruptcy and an unperfected security interest it 
is crucial to the outcome in each of these cases whether or not the property is exempt. If 
there is no underlying exemption the trustee will be able to challenge the unperfected 
security interest and prevent the creditor from seizing the asset as a secured creditor. 
Even where a court finds that an asset falls within an exempt category it must still 
consider whether the exemption is a right (i.e. something that exists automatically) or a 
privilege which may only be asserted by a debtor, or lost altogether. There are divergent 
views whether a secured party might assert the existence of such an exemption when a 
debtor has waived or not claimed an exemption.142  
 
[68] The Alberta Court of Appeal in A.C. Waring Associates Inc. v. Direct Rental Centre 
(West) Ltd.143 held that the lessor was able to enforce its security interest in the exempt 
property notwithstanding that its security interest was unperfected.  It held that the 
household furniture, namely a sofa and television, was exempt as a matter of right under 
the Civil Enforcement Act and existed without a particular claim by the debtors. This 
enabled the secured party to assert the existence of the exemption and prevail over the 
trustee in bankruptcy.  The Alberta approach has been followed in British Columbia.144 
 
[69] In Nova Scotia and Ontario the courts reached the opposite result in that the 
unperfected secured parties were unable to seize the property.  Under the terms of the 
Nova Scotia PPSA, a motor vehicle subject to a purchase money security interest is not 
exempt.  Thus in VW Credit Canada v. Roberts145  the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held 
that by virtue of s. 21(2) of the Nova Scotia  PPSA the trustee had priority over the 
unperfected secured creditor. The Court held that the trustee was entitled to the value of 
the motor vehicle for distribution to all unsecured creditors.   
 
[70] Finally, in Ontario the outcome in Re Fields146 turned on the Court of Appeal’s 
conclusion that the $5000 motor vehicle exemption in the Execution Act did not exempt 
any amount of an $11,000 motor vehicle.  As the entire value of motor vehicle was not 
exempt DaimlerChrslyer, as an unperfected secured party, was not able to pursue its 
secured claim against the motor vehicle. 
 
[71] As the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act currently defers to provincial exemption 
legislation, the specific terms of the underlying provincial exemption statute will remain 
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relevant to resolving this issue. More specifically the provincial determination of what is 
exempt property and whether an exemption is a right or a privilege affects whether the 
secured party will prevail. At present the diverse state of provincial law produces diverse 
results. 
 
V  Bankruptcy Reform: An Optional Federal List. 
[72] In November 2003, the Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and 
Commerce broadly endorsed the principle of an optional federal exemption regime for 
the BIA. 147 If implemented, this recommendation would represent a fundamental shift in 
Canadian bankruptcy policy from the current position of s.67(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act which incorporates provincial exemption law. 
 
[73] The Senate Committee recommendation was largely based upon the earlier report of 
the Personal Insolvency Task Force (PITF) that provided a broad outline of a proposed 
federal exemption list.   The optional list, according to the Report, “will ensure that all 
bankrupts will have access to what is regarded as a reasonable set of exemptions 
regardless of the bankrupt’s place of residence or weaknesses and gaps in the provincial 
or territorial legislation.”148  A debtor would have the option of selecting either the 
federal list or the relevant applicable provincial or territorial law. 
 
[74] The list, which is set out at Appendix 12 to this report, resembles many of the 
traditional categories of exempt property found in provincial law. The proposal includes 
specific monetary caps for many items that are to be adjusted to the CPI. The PITF 
proposal aims for more uniformity but there are aspects of the proposal that defers to 
provincial law.  For example, the regime seeks to establish a uniform $5000 personal 
residence exemption. However, a debtor whose livelihood is derived from farming, 
fishing, forestry and other activities related to the natural resource sector may be entitled 
to enhanced exemptions for real and personal property. The amount of the exemption is 
to be governed by the applicable provincial or territorial law but is not to be less than 
$10,000 and not more than $20,000.   
 
[75] Although the broad policy justifications for exemptions would appear to equally 
apply in a bankruptcy149 there are some fundamental differences between bankruptcy and 
provincial enforcement proceedings which might justify a separate federal regime.150 
Traditionally,  provincial law has been geared to the resolution of an individual judgment 
creditor’s claim against the debtor. Judgment enforcement proceedings do not 
contemplate a discharge of the debtor’s liabilities. Bankruptcy contemplates a collective 
proceeding whereby the claims of all of the creditors are considered in a single forum. 
Exemptions have an impact on the level of distribution to creditors as a class in 
bankruptcy.  Further, the end result of bankruptcy proceedings is some form of absolute 
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or conditional discharge.  The discharge and exempt property are inherently linked to the 
larger goal of rehabilitation. Tied to the bankrupt’s fresh start after bankruptcy is whether 
the debtor has been able to retain sufficient exempt assets to further the goal of 
rehabilitation.151  
 
[76] To the extent that provincial exemption law varies across the country there will be 
different outcomes on the nature of the fresh start available to the debtor and the level of 
distribution to creditors.  Section 68 of the BIA already provides for national surplus 
income guidelines which supplant provincial wage exemption laws in a bankruptcy. 
Justice Iacobucci in Marzetti v. Marzetti152 confirmed that s. 68 of the BIA was designed 
to “remedy province-to-province disparities in the application of the Bankruptcy Act”.153 
On the issue of wages and income Iacobucci J. concluded that “Parliament no doubt 
considered it unreasonable for the treatment of bankrupt persons to depend upon the 
happenstance of provincial residence.”154   
 
[77] Critics note that a federal bankruptcy exemption regime may have the effect of 
triggering unwarranted bankruptcies where there is a substantial difference between 
federal and provincial exemptions.155  Debtors and creditors may forum shop or elect to 
be governed by the most favourable exemption regime. Where the federal limit is lower 
than the local exemption law, creditors are said to have an incentive to force debtors into 
bankruptcy.  Conversely, where provincial exemptions are more modest than the federal 
exemption standard, debtors have an incentive to make a voluntary assignment in 
bankruptcy.  It is argued, uniform bankruptcy exemptions would have a “disruptive 
effect”156 on local collection procedures.   
 
[78] However, such claims need to be substantiated with empirical evidence linking 
bankruptcy filing rates with exemption levels.157    A multitude of factors will affect a 
debtor’s decision to make an assignment in bankruptcy.  Factors such as the stay of 
proceedings and the discharge may well outweigh the level of exemptions.158  Current 
Canadian law attempts to channel debtors away from straight bankruptcy and encourages 
debtors to make proposals.  
 
Conclusion 
[79] The proposal for a Uniform Civil Enforcement Act provides an opportunity to 
debate the underlying principles of exemption law.  A debate that focuses only on 
specific categories of property ignores larger questions of whether the traditional 
justifications for exemption law that have been canvassed in this paper remain as 
significant today. It is relevant to ask whether the increasing availability of consumer 
credit and current levels of social welfare legislation strengthen, or weaken the case for 
changes to exemption levels.   
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[80] Further, provinces and territories must also consider the larger question of whether a 
uniform exemption regime is possible or even desirable. The US experience illustrates 
the difficulties of implementing a uniform exemption law at the state level. In 1976 the 
NCCUSL approved the Uniform Exemption Act. Currently only Alaska has adopted the 
Model Law as the basis for its exemption regime. Uniformity may be difficult given that 
the cost of living, the stability of incomes, the level of social support, and the types of 
economic activity vary across the country.159  However, the assumption that local 
legislatures are more readily able to recognize local needs and interests ignores the 
significant cost of living variances that exist within each province. It also ignores the 
rather obvious fact that provincial law has not been kept current.160  
 
[81] The need to accommodate local needs need not preclude the adoption of a more 
uniform exemption regime. In part, the Working Group’s proposals acknowledge the 
difficulty of achieving absolute uniformity as the Draft Act contemplates that 
jurisdictions will differ on appropriate caps for various types of property.  At the very 
least, the Working Group’s proposals should persuade each province and territory to 
review exemption legislation with a view to locating exemption law in a single and more 
up to date exemption statute. Further, if the federal government proceeds to implement an 
optional federal exemption regime it would do well to consider the more detailed 
proposals found in the ULCC Draft Act. The ULCC would also benefit by examining 
some of the alternative ways of achieving uniformity proposed by the PITF. 
 
                                                 
* Portions of this paper were based on an earlier presentation “The Proposed Federal Exemption Regime for 
the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act” at the 33rd Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law, 
University of Toronto. I have benefited from comments from workshop participants as well as from discussions 
with the ULCC Working Group on Civil Enforcement of Judgments at a meeting earlier this year. The 
NCCUSL kindly provided me with transcripts of the debates on the Uniform Exemption Act.  I would like to 
acknowledge the research assistance provided by law students Katharine Ho and Lee Cassey. 
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